Tax and the right to health by O'Hare, Bernadette Ann-Marie
   D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 8    V O L U M E  2 0    N U M B E R  2   Health and Human Rights Journal 57 
Health and Human Rights Journal
HHr
HHR_final_logo_alone.indd   1 10/19/15   10:53 AM
perspective
Tax and the Right to Health
bernadette ann-marie o’hare
Introduction
Human rights are enshrined in numerous international treaties, including the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, the right to health is limited by the principle of progressive 
realization, which has left loopholes allowing the deferment of fundamental human rights.1 Many of these 
fundamental human rights—such as the rights to food, water, and sanitation—are critical determinants of 
health (see Box 1). Indeed, in its General Comment 14, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights interprets the right to health as an inclusive right that encompasses the underlying 
determinants of health and health care.2 The importance of these fundamental rights to health is demon-
strated by the fact that access to them accounted for most of the reductions in child and maternal mortality 
between 1990 and 2015.3 These rights are also among the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, 
many people throughout the world—particularly those in low-income countries—do not have access to 
them (see Figure 1). The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its General 
Comment 3, has tried to compensate for the loopholes that facilitate governments’ and their development 
partners’ complacency in fulfilling these rights by defining non-derogable minimum core obligations that 
establish a minimum set of protections that are immediately applicable to all people in all nations and not 
subject to the flexibilities permitted by progressive realization.4 
Technically speaking, it would be financially feasible to remedy these deprivations relative to the over-
all level of global resources. For example, the annual cost of providing improved water and sanitation for 
the unserved is US$28.4 billion, which is a mere 1.6% of annual global military expenditure.5 However, in 
order to build a state-citizen relationship and to generate ongoing tax revenue, these rights should ideally be 
funded through a financial process that is transparent, accountable, and responsible and includes domestic 
revenue generation for public services.6 The benefits of relying on domestic resources instead of overseas 
development aid are multiple: less volatility, more citizen participation, and a focus on local (as opposed to 
donor) priorities.7 That said, government revenue in low-income countries is minimal—on average, it is less 
than US$100 per capita—and government expenditure on health is less than US$20 per capita.8 Therefore, 
while the responsibility for fulfilling fundamental human rights lies within national borders, sometimes 
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governments’ ability to finance such fulfilment lies 
out of their reach.9 
Tax abuses have a negative impact on funda-
mental human rights, yet human rights scholars 
have largely ignored the need for revenue, and tax 
scholars rarely analyze laws and policies through a 
human rights lens.10 This essay discusses government 
revenue and public services as they relate to human 
rights and explores who the relevant duty-bearers 
are, as well as what actions they could take to in-
crease the chances of everyone, everywhere, having 
access to their fundamental human rights. 
Government revenue, public services, and 
fundamental human rights
The pathway between government revenue, 
government expenditure, public services, and fun-
damental human rights is known.11 For example, a 
10% increase in tax revenue leads to a 17% increase 
in public health spending in low-income countries, 
and increasing public health spending by 1% de-
creases under-five mortality by 0.86%.12 However, 
the limiting factor in many countries is government 
revenue, and before identifying global mechanisms 
Source: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact sheet no. 33: Frequently asked questions on economic, social and 
cultural rights (2008). Available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet33en.pdf.
Box 1. Examples of minimum core obligations
Minimum core obligations—as highlighted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its general comments—require 
states to undertake the following actions:
• Ensure the right of access to employment, especially for disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups, enabling them to live a 
life of dignity.
• Ensure access to the minimum essential food that is nutritionally adequate and safe.
• Ensure access to basic shelter, housing, and sanitation, and an adequate supply of safe drinking water.
• Provide essential drugs as defined under the World Health Organization’s Action Programme on Essential Drugs.
• Ensure free and compulsory primary education for all.
• Ensure access to a social security scheme that provides a minimum essential level of benefits that cover at least essential health care, basic 
shelter and housing, water and sanitation, food, and the most basic forms of education.
Primary school completion = % eligible who complete primary school. Water = % of population using at least basic drinking water services. 
Universal health coverage index = coverage of essential health services. Sanitation = % of the population using at least basic sanitation services.
Source: World Bank, Databank (2018). Available at https://data.worldbank.org.
Figure 1. Coverage of fundamental human rights, by country income level
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to plug these gaps, leakages from current revenue 
streams should be curtailed.13 Lost government 
revenues as a result of international and national 
injustices and inefficiencies include tax waivers, the 
failure to tax wealthy citizens and the informal sector, 
corporate tax avoidance, corruption, and debt repay-
ment by the state.14 Taxes are the main contributor 
to government revenue in all countries. However, 
tax as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) 
is much lower (18%) in low-income countries than 
in high-income countries (40%).15 Reasons for this 
tax gap include undertaxing the informal sector 
and wealthy citizens, granting tax waivers, and tax 
avoidance by international corporations.16 
Domestic and international tax avoidance and 
waivers result in the burden falling on small do-
mestic companies and individual taxpayers, which 
can often mean insufficient revenues that lead to 
reduced social spending and thus reduced access 
to fundamental human rights.17 The resulting fiscal 
deficits may skew taxation toward indirect taxes, 
which tend to be regressive and place a burden on 
low-income groups, who often have the least voice 
on the political stage.18
The informal sector accounts for approximate-
ly 40% of GDP in many low- and middle-income 
countries.19 Reasons for failing to tax this sector in-
clude logistical problems (especially in agricultural 
societies), weak financial systems (which inhibit 
the tracking of companies’ and individuals’ tax 
obligations), and a lack of capacity.20 However, a 
further reason for undertaxed wealthy citizens and 
companies is their political influence on tax policy 
formulation and administration.21 
Tax incentives are widely used to attract for-
eign investment, despite the lack of evidence that 
they promote economic growth.22 Countries often 
compete with one another to attract foreign invest-
ment by offering incentives such as tax holidays, 
which sets off a race to the bottom in which public 
purses suffer and shareholders benefit. While tax 
avoidance in the informal sector and decisions 
about tax incentives fall under the remit of national 
governments, tackling international corporate tax 
avoidance is the responsibility of a broader group of 
actors, as explained in the next section. 
International corporate tax avoidance and 
government revenue
In low- and middle-income countries, 20% of 
government revenue is derived from corporate in-
come tax, compared to 10% in wealthy countries.23 
Therefore, multinational corporations (MNCs) 
have a substantial impact on government revenue 
in all countries but are critically important in low- 
and middle-income countries. Corporate income 
tax is payable only when MNCs realize profits. 
Taxing profit allows for avoidance opportunities, 
including overstating costs (including intangible 
services such as managerial support and interest 
payments in thinly capitalized projects) when sell-
ing to related entities (transfer pricing).24 In theory, 
related entities use an “arm’s length” price and 
charge subsidiaries the same price as they would 
an unrelated company, but this is often not done in 
practice.25 Base erosion and profit shifting is a term 
used to describe the shifting of taxable profits out 
of the country where the income was generated into 
low-tax and secrecy jurisdictions (also called tax 
havens) where there may be little or no economic 
activity, using transfer pricing between related en-
tities to reduce the amount of tax due.26 In addition, 
tax treaties between countries are used to minimize 
tax by diverting profit via states with a favorable 
treaty in place.27 
Who are the duty-bearers for tax avoidance 
and what can they do?
The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights direct MNCs to avoid adversely 
affecting human rights, and guidelines from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development state that MNCs should contribute 
to environmental, economic, and social progress.28 
Despite these guidelines, international corporate 
tax avoidance is estimated to be US$500–650 bil-
lion each year, one-third of which is from low- and 
middle-income countries.29 Leaders of MNCs that 
minimize tax payments in countries where large 
proportions of the population have unmet funda-
mental human rights are duty-bearers and should 
move this issue up on their agenda by ensuring 
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board-level scrutiny and by reporting profits and 
taxes paid publicly. 
Among the strategies to tackle base erosion 
and profit shifting is one first proposed by the Tax 
Justice Network and now driven by the G20 and 
G8 and agreed to by 100 countries, which requires 
large MNCs to report profits and economic activ-
ity, by country, to the revenue authority of their 
parent company.30 This information is confiden-
tial and shared only with authorities in countries 
where there is a related entity if there is a bilateral 
agreement in place.31 However, an initiative by the 
Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on 
International Standards of Accounting and Report-
ing (coordinated by the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development) proposes a public 
framework for country-by-country reporting, with 
indicators relevant to the achievement of the SDGs, 
including revenue, tax paid, green investment, and 
community investment.32 The Global Reporting 
Initiative, which sets standards for stock exchanges 
and thousands of firms, is also developing a draft 
standard for public country-by-country reporting 
of tax and other payments to governments. The 
integration of these two methodologies may pro-
duce a robust, public country-by-country reporting 
framework for the SDGs.33
Governments are obliged to use their max-
imum available resources to realize fundamental 
human rights.34 However, Nigeria, for example, 
has 5,000 tax inspectors for a population of 140 
million, compared to the Netherlands, which has 
30,000 inspectors for a population of 10 million.35 
Regarding international tax avoidance, only eight 
African countries have units within their revenue 
authorities that focus on transfer pricing, most of 
which were established recently. Kenya’s unit uses 
techniques such as tip-offs from the public and 
screening processes that flag MNCs doing busi-
ness in countries with a history of harboring tax 
abusers. These units face numerous challenges, 
including high-income countries not responding to 
requests for information even when a tax treaty is 
in place, a lack of data for price comparisons to al-
low estimations of arm’s-length pricing, inadequate 
capacity, and corruption.36 An approach taken by 
Vietnam has been to require domestic subsidiar-
ies of large MNCs to provide a copy of the global 
country-by-country report to the Vietnamese tax 
authorities, which reduces the burden on these 
authorities.37 Governments that grant tax incen-
tives need to be confident that the economic and 
development gains as a result of the investments 
do not outweigh the costs regarding revenue avail-
able for public services and fundamental human 
rights. Recent evidence shows that tax treaties with 
low-tax and secrecy jurisdictions do not result in 
additional investment and lead to average revenue 
losses of 15% of corporate income tax.38 Challenges 
to both domestic and international tax abuse in all 
countries include a lack of political will, as political 
leaders may have vested interests and wish to ex-
empt specific industries.39
Other duty-bearers include the home coun-
tries (generally high-income countries) of MNCs, 
which are required to prevent infringements of 
rights outside their territory by business entities 
over which they can exercise control.40 Stock ex-
changes could exclude MNCs with tax havens in 
their corporate structure; for example, one-quarter 
of the MNCs listed on the London Stock Exchange 
with mining operations in Africa use tax havens.41 
High-income countries should also review their tax 
treaties with low- and middle- income countries to 
ensure that there are no adverse spillover effects on 
fundamental human rights.42
Enablers of tax avoidance and their profession-
al bodies, including tax professionals, accountants, 
lawyers, bankers, and the nominees of shell com-
panies, need to appreciate that tax planning often 
adversely affects fundamental human rights.43 The 
world’s largest accounting firms have helped MNCs 
avoid billions of dollars in taxes.44 The investment 
community, including pension fund managers, 
should stop regarding tax as a cost to be minimized; 
for example, 75% of pension beneficiaries in the UK 
feel it is vital that their pensions not be invested in 
MNCs that avoid taxes, and 78% believe that it is 
essential that MNCs pay their fair share of taxes in 
low-income countries.45
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What role can individuals play? The links 
between individual choices and human 
rights
Elizabeth Ashford suggests that there is a web of 
complex interactions that results in structural 
injustices and, like Iris Young, believes that the 
collective that has produced it is responsible.46 The 
concept of ownership, which motivates consid-
eration of the links between one’s decisions and 
others’ lack of fundamental human rights, may 
drive different choices.47 Thomas Pogge states that if 
more people understood their role in poverty, more 
might try to eradicate it.48 For example, one link be-
tween individual choices and fundamental human 
rights is the taxes paid by MNCs, and an increased 
awareness of individual responsibility may drive 
consumers to choose brands and investments that 
do not avoid taxes, to vote for governments that act 
to change unjust global institutional arrangements, 
and to avoid banks that facilitate tax avoidance.49 A 
familiar narrative used to challenge this approach 
is that action will be ineffective due to corruption 
by undemocratic governments. However, Pogge 
argues that some corrupt governments continue to 
be in power because of a global institutional order 
that enables the exchange of finance and weapons 
for natural resources.50 
Conclusion
The critical determinants of health are water, 
sanitation, health care, and education. These are 
fundamental human rights and are included in the 
SDGs. They are most sustainably provided for by 
public services and financed with domestically gener-
ated revenue. Barriers to governments meeting their 
minimum core obligations for the right to health in-
clude insufficient revenue. International corporate tax 
avoidance is among the reasons for this. 
Action is required at many different levels by 
a range of duty-bearers. These include MNCs, gov-
ernments, professional enablers of tax avoidance, 
and individuals who are in a position to make vot-
ing, banking, consuming, and investment choices. 
References
1. L. Forman, G. Ooms, A. Chapman, et al., “What could 
a strengthened right to health bring to the post-2015 health 
development agenda? Interrogating the role of the minimum 
core concept in advancing essential global health need,” 
BMC International Health and Human Rights 13/48 (2013). 
2. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No. 14, The right to the highest attainable 
standard of health, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000). 
3. D. M. Bishai, R. Cohen, Y. N. Alfonso, et al., “Factors 
contributing to maternal and child mortality reductions in 
146 low- and middle-income countries between 1990 and 
2010,” PLoS One 11/1.
4. United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3, The Nature of 
States Parties’ Obligations, UN Doc. E/1991/23 (1991); For-
man et al. (see note 1).
5. G. Hutton and M. Varughese, The costs of meeting the 
2030 Sustainable Development Goal targets on drinking water, 
sanitation, and hygiene: Summary report (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 2016); SIPRI, Arms transfers database (2017). 
Available at http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.
6. A. Waris and L. A. Latif, “Towards establishing fiscal 
legitimacy through settled fiscal principles in global health 
financing,” Health Care Analysis 23 (2015), pp. 376–390. 
7. C. Fuest and N. Riedel, “Tax evasion and tax avoid-
ance: The role of international profit shifting,” in P. Reuter 
(ed), Draining development? Controlling flows of illicit funds 
from developing countries, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2012).
8. International Center for Tax and Development and 
}AdvocateBanking choicesConscious consuming DivestEducate The rights to water, sanitation, health care, education MNCs Government revenue Public services Mortality 
Figure 2. The pathway between individual choices and the core rights of others
b. a. o’hare / perspective, Human Rights and the Social Determinants of Health, 57-63
62
D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 8    V O L U M E  2 0    N U M B E R  2   Health and Human Rights Journal
United Nations University World Institute for Development 
Economics Research, Government revenue dataset (2017); 
World Health Organizaton, Global health observatory data 
(2017). Available at http://www.who.int/gho/en.
9. E. Ashford, “The infliction of subsistence deprivations 
as a perfect crime,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
118/1 (2018), pp. 83–106; T. Pogge, “World poverty and human 
rights,” Ethics and International Affairs 19/1 (2005), pp. 1–7. 
10. International Bar Association, Tax abuses, poverty 
and human rights: A report of the International Bar Asso-
ciation’s human rights institute task force on illicit financial 
flows, poverty and human rights (London: International Bar 
Association, 2013); A. Waris, Tax and development: Solving 
Kenya’s fiscal crisis through human rights (Oxford: African 
Books Collective, 2013). 
11. A. Reeves, Y. Gourtsoyannis, S. Basu, et al., “Financing 
universal health coverage: Effects of alternative tax struc-
tures on public health systems; Cross-national modelling 
in 89 low-income and middle-income countries,” Lancet 
386/9990 (2015), pp. 274–280. 
12. R. Tamarappoo, P. Pokhrel, M. Raman, and J. Francy, 
Analysis of the linkage between domestic revenue mobilization 
and social analysis of the linkage between domestic revenue 
mobilization and social sector spending (Washington, DC: 
USAID, 2016); F. Haile and M. Niño-Zarazúa, “Does social 
spending improve welfare in low-income and middle-in-
come countries?” Journal of International Development 30/3 
(2017), pp. 367–398. 
13. Waris and Latif (see note 6).
14. B. O’Hare and I. Makuta, “An analysis of the potential 
for achieving the fourth-millennium development goal in 
SSA with domestic resources,” Globalization and Health 11/8 
(2015); M. Curtis and B. O’Hare, “Lost revenues in low-in-
come countries” (2017). Available at http://curtisresearch.
org/wp-content/uploads/Lost-revenues.pdf.
15. J. Slemrod, “Tax systems in developing countries” 
(keynote lecture at Zurich Center for Economic Develop-
ment, 2016). Available at http://www.econ.uzh.ch/dam/
jcr:79e9554f-e7ac-4068-93e6-1921226ac68c/Slemrod_
Speech.pdf.
16. M. Moore, “Obstacles to increasing tax revenues in 
low-income countries” (2013). Available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2436437.
17. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 
High-level panel on illicit financial flows. Available at http://
www.uneca.org/iff.
18. Moore (see note 16); G. Brock and H. Russell, “Abusive 
tax avoidance and institutional corruption: The responsibil-
ities of tax professionals,” Edmond J. Safra Working Paper 
No. 56 (2015). Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2566281.
19. F. Schneider and C. C. Williams, “The shadow econo-
my,” Journal of International Affairs 53/2 (2013), p. 387. 
20. Moore (see note 16); R. Gordon and W. Li, “Tax struc-
tures in developing countries: Many puzzles and a possible 
explanation,” Journal of Public Economics 93/7–8 (2009), pp. 
855–866. 
21. Moore (see note 16).
22. S. N. Stausholm, “Rise of ineffective incentives: New 
empirical evidence on tax holidays in developing countries” 
(2017). Available at https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/4sn3k.
23. Gordon and Li (see note 20). 
24. D. Hubert, Many ways to lose a billion: How govern-
ments fail to secure a fair share of natural resource wealth 
(Publish What You Pay – Canada, 2017).
25. M. Durst, “Improving the performance of natural 
resource taxation in developing countries,” ICTD Working 
Paper No. 60 (2016). Available at https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/
opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/12797/ICTD_WP60.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
26. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment, Inclusive framework on BEPS (2017). Available 
at http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/background-brief-inclu-
sive-framework-for-beps-implementation.pdf.
27. M. Hearson, “Tax-motivated illicit finan-
cial flows: A guide for development practitioners,” 
U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre (2014). Available at 
http://www.u4.no/publications/tax-motivated-illicit-finan-
cial-flows-a-guide-for-development-practitioners.
28. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Guiding principles on business and human 
rights (New York: United Nations, 2011); Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD guide-
lines for multinational enterprises (Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011). 
29. A. Cobham and P. Janský, “Global distribution of rev-
enue loss from corporate tax avoidance: Re-estimation and 
country results,” Journal of International Development 232 
(2018), pp. 206–232; E. Crivelli, R. De Mooij, and M. Keen, 
“Base erosion, profit shifting and developing countries,” 
Public Finance Analysis 72 (2016), pp. 267–301. 
30. A. Cobham, P. Janský, and M. Meinzer, “A half-cen-
tury of resistance to corporate disclosure,” Transnational 
Corporations 25/3 (2018), pp. 1–27.
31. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (see note 26). 
32. United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment, Guidance on core indicators for entity reporting on 
the contribution towards the attainment of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (2018). Available at http://isar.unctad.
org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Guidance-on-Core-Indi-
cator_ISAR-35.pdf.
33. A. Cobham, “Country by country reporting for the 
Sustainable Development Goals,” Tax Justice Network 
(2018). Available at https://www.taxjustice.net/2018/10/25/
country-by-country-reporting-for-the-sustainable-develop-
b. a. o’hare / perspective, Human Rights and the Social Determinants of Health, 57-63
   D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 8    V O L U M E  2 0    N U M B E R  2   Health and Human Rights Journal 63
ment-goals.
34. International Bar Association (see note 10).
35. K. Sharife, M. Kohonen, and D. Alemayehu, Tax us if 
you can: Why Africa should stand up for tax justice (Pamba-
zuka Press, 2018). 
36. A. Waris, “How Kenya has implemented and adjusted 
to the changes in international transfer pricing regulations: 
1920–2016,” International Centre for Tax and Development 
(2018). Available at https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/
bitstream/handle/123456789/13401/ICTD_WP69.pdf.
37. Tax Justice Network, Vietnam legislates on country by 
country reporting (2017). Available at http://www.taxjustice.
net/2017/04/24/vietnam-legislates-country-country-reporting.
38. S. Beer and J. Loeprick, “The cost and benefits of tax 
treaties with investment hubs: Findings from sub-Saharan 
Africa,” IMF Working Paper 227 (2018). Available at https://
www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/10/24/
The-Cost-and-Benefits-of-Tax-Treaties-with-Investment-
Hubs-Findings-from-Sub-Saharan-Africa-46264?cid=em-
COM-123-37872.
39. Waris (2018, see note 36). 
40. Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No. 24, State Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the Context of Business Activities, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/24 (2017).
41. M. Curtis, “The new colonialism: Britain’s 
scramble for Africa’s energy and mineral resources” 
(2016). Available at https://waronwant.org/sites/default/files/
TheNewColonialism.pdf.
42. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(see note 17); Independent Commission for Aid Impact, UK 
aid’s contribution to tackling tax avoidance and evasion: A 
learning review (2016). Available at http://icai.independent.
gov.uk/report/tax.
43. J. P. Bohoslavsky, Illicit Financial Flows, Human 
Rights and the Post-2015 Development Agenda: Interim 
Study by the Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign 
Debt and Other Related International Financial Obligations 
of States on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/28/60 (2015). 
44. Brock and Russell (see note 18). 
45. Principles for Responsible Investment Initiative, En-
gagement guidance on corporate tax responsibility: Why and 
how to engage with your investee companies (2015). Available 
at https://www.unpri.org/about/what-is-responsible-in-
vestment; Christian Aid, Tax avoidance (2017). Available at 
http://www.comresglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/
Christian-Aid-Tax-Avoidance-Nov-2017.pdf.
46. Ashford (see note 9); I. M. Young, “Political respon-
sibility and structural injustice” (2003). Available at https://
www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/cas_sites/sociology/
pdf/PoliticalResponsibility.pdf.
47. Young (see note 46). 
48. Pogge (see note 9). 
49. B. O’Hare, “Active global citizenship: Ethical living to 
promote human rights,” Health and Human Rights Journal 
blog (2018). Available at https://www.hhrjournal.org/2018/11/
active-global-citizenship-ethical-living-to-promote-hu-
man-rights.
50. Pogge (see note 9).

